

posed amendments, July-October 1920" are followed by the succinct "Sir Samuel's desiderata for the frontiers of Palestine, September-October 1920."

Volume three (Palestine-Syria II; Palestine-Transjordan) begins with the 1920 Anglo-French *Projet de Convention* on the northeastern boundary question, which was critically affected by the parties' claims to the waters of the Litani and Yarmuk rivers. Zionist irrigation plans became a top priority for the Foreign Office, and negotiations continued until the summer of 1922 (300 pages). Documents then cover the delimitation of the northern boundary between the Mediterranean and al-Hamma, a village on the Yarmuk River southeast of Lake Tiberias that was connected by a thin strip of land to Mandate Palestine. Observations and adjustments of the Syria-Palestine borders in the years 1924, 1926, 1932-34, 1937-38, 1941, and 1946-47 complete this section.

The Palestine-Transjordan documents contain notes on military administration, 1920, excerpts of the March 1921 Cairo Conference chaired by Winston Churchill to discuss the development of Palestine and its external relations and the ensuing White Paper, drafts and supplementary material on the December 1922 mandate for Palestine, the February 1928 agreement with Transjordan, and some material on the use of the Jordan River in 1927 and 1947.

The Archive International Group has produced an invaluable documentary collection that should be on the shelves of any extensive Middle East library.

PALESTINIANS IN THE GALILEE

Small-Scale Enterprises in Arab Villages: A Case Study from the Galilee Region in Israel, by Naseem Jeryis. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1990. *Geografiska Regionstudier* no. 22. x + 135 pages. Bibliography to p. 145. \$25.00 paper.

Reviewed by **Ghazi Falah**

There is a real dearth of empirical data on the Palestinian population of Israel. Jeryis's book, based on data gathered from nine Arab villages in the Galilee, could therefore be ex-

pected to fill some gaps in the scientific literature.

The author defines the purpose of his book, originally written as a doctoral dissertation at Uppsala University, Sweden, as:

to analyze the characteristics and development of the small-scale enterprise sector in Arab settlement in northern Israel, within the broader context of studies of social and economic change in traditional societies, and, specifically, within the context of relations between the Arab sector and modern Jewish sector in Israel (p. ii).

The author's theoretical framework, discussed in chapter two, is most useful and a correct point of departure for addressing the topic. The development of small-scale economic enterprises among the Galilee Arab villages is better understood within the context of development theory, specifically that of "development from below."¹ This type of development is one aspect of the process of urbanization that has emerged over the past two decades in Israel's Arab sector. The problem in Jeryis's analysis is that he never clarifies how the process he describes so well in theoretical terms relates to the Israeli Arabs. In fact, the continuous loss of Arab agricultural land due to systematic expropriation indirectly enhanced the general processes of urbanization and eventually resulted in the ascendance of the wage-earner category among Israeli Arabs. The Israeli Jewish market offered Arab workers neither viable jobs and equal opportunities in the urban centers nor independence and self-reliance. The Arabs were kept in the market periphery of the state. But the failure of the Israeli Jewish market to integrate them on an equal basis (with Jewish workers) gave Arab individuals the impetus to abandon their jobs once they had accumulated sufficient capital so as to open new economic enterprises in their ethnic localities—the "development from below." Elsewhere, I have used the term "urban function" instead of small-scale enterprise in examining the current stage in the transformation of Arab rural economy in Israel.²

The case of the Arabs in Galilee is made

1. Walter B. Stöhr. "Developments from Below: The Bottom-up and Periphery-Inward Development Paradigm." In Walter B. Stöhr and D.R.F. Taylor, *Development from Above or Below?* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 1981), pp. 39-72.

2. Ghazi Falah. "Trends in the Urbanization of Arab Settlements in Galilee." *Urban Geography* (November-December 1992).

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more complicated by the "Judaization" policy of the region—a policy to which, curiously enough, the author never refers in the entire work. This policy has invested state capital and developed large-scale industry in the region for almost the sole benefit of the Jewish population, which still forms a small minority there; no real attempt has been made to integrate the majority Arabs in a viable and meaningful way. Nor were the Arabs given sufficient capital by the state to develop their own independent village economy. Against this political reality, the Arabs of Galilee have made great efforts to mobilize their own resources—human, physical, and institutional—in search of alternatives. Small-scale enterprises (or the development of urban function) are in fact the product of such efforts.

Unfortunately, Jerjis, a Palestinian from Galilee, does not address these developments in this political context but instead looks at his compatriots from a perspective that was current among Zionist writers in the 1960s and 1970s. This approach saw Arab villages as traditional communities in which the "family" (or *hamula*) stands at the center, while the Jewish sector was viewed as the modern through which progress and development were diffused ("To some extent the organizational structure of the modern sector has *penetrated* or has been *duplicated* in the traditional sector" [emphasis added, p. 129]). This type of concept is not only false but is today scarcely adopted even by Israeli scholars. Moreover, Jerjis's own findings are in effect at odds with this axiom: his book frequently shows that the so-called "traditional family" contributes significant capital and labor to the development of small-scale enterprises. The Orientalist over-emphasis on "tradition" has not only distorted reality but made the author an "alien" to his people: in the course of conducting field work, he states: "I made my introductory visit accompanied by someone who would be regarded as trustworthy" (p. 29).

This approach is not the only problem. Another major weakness lies in the empirical data, for the book was written *one decade* after the start of field work. Exploratory field work was carried out over May-September 1979, followed by a "major phase of field work . . . between May 1980 and February 1981" (p. 28). In August 1989 the author returned "to collect supplementary data" (p. 47), which were marginally incorporated in the analysis. The author conceded that the selection of a nine-village sample for investigations was a "necessary restriction in view of the need for

rather extensive data collection through field work" (p. 25) and that "the sample of villages is not representative in a statistical sense" (p. 27). A more structural problem of methodology lies in the selection of sample firms, which includes 35 percent of all small-scale enterprises in the nine villages in 1980. According to the author, "the size of the sample was determined more by the number of interviews which could be completed within the time available than by any formal sample design" (p. 30). This methodological flaw leads to grave problems. The share of the small-scale enterprises he accords to manufacturing firms (p. 39), for example, is disproportionately high, as is the percentage of the labor force in Arab villages employed in small-scale enterprises as a whole. Such findings appear even more distorted when the author tries to compare them with the Jewish sector. Thus, the empirical data gathered for this study are not only outdated but also inherently unreliable, which renders comparison with the various other surveys on the same topic by other authors virtually useless.

The background information on the Arab sector in Israel in chapter one is sketchy and contains numerous mistakes, for example, that the military rule imposed on the Arabs in Israel ended in 1962 (instead of 1967). On page 4 the author states that there were 112 Arab settlements in Israel in 1980, but his table 1.5 (p. 9) shows 130 localities in the same year. He also undercounted the Arab towns and villages in the "Triangle" (the area along the West Bank border northeast of Tel Aviv), citing 13 where in fact there are 32. On page 7 he describes the Negev Bedouin as "nomads or liv[ing] in rural settlements," whereas the policy inaugurated in 1951 of concentrating the Bedouin in "closed areas" has prevented them from being nomads. The maps, tables, and text tend to use Hebrew names for Arab localities (Shefar'am instead of Shafa 'Amr, Zefat instead of Safad, etc.).

In short, the book is a controversial piece of work. The author demonstrates a sound knowledge of development theories and despite the limitations of his empirical data he shows fairly good insight in dealing with the research topic at hand. The problems begin with his attempt to place his subject matter in a framework in keeping with a certain way of viewing the Middle East; one might also question whether pragmatic considerations for the future may not have influenced his systematic refusal to deal with the political environment surrounding his study. A description of Israel as "democratic" (p. 133) in a book on this topic, as well as statistical figures of pre-1967

Israel that include occupied (and annexed) East Jerusalem, would appear to lend credence to this line of inquiry.

IDF QUAGMIRE AND SOLUTION

The Intifada: Causes and Effects, by Aryeh Shalev. Boulder, CO and Jerusalem: Westview Press/Jerusalem Post, 1991. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Study No. 16. 189 pages. Notes to p. 204. Appendices to p. 255. \$34.95 paper.

Reviewed by **Mouin Rabbani**

The popular uprising in the occupied Palestinian territories has been a challenge to the Israeli national security establishment having few parallels since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. First the intelligence services failed to anticipate and prevent it. Then the military high command refused to recognize the scope and character of the mass demonstrations and thereby facilitated their transformation into a coherent popular rebellion. And in the ensuing months and years, the Israeli military, still recovering from defeat in Lebanon, consistently failed to quell the uprising or even regain its deterrent profile vis-à-vis the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Given this reality, significant elements within the national security establishment resorted to an interesting defense of their failure. Rather than seek cover in the alleged recalcitrance of the political leadership as did American generals during the Vietnam war, these strategists argued that their government is culpable for forcing them into the impossible position of resolving a political problem with military means. Taken to its logical conclusion, such thinking has resulted in some decidedly unorthodox proposals regarding the future relationship between Israel and the occupied territories, including negotiations between Israel and the PLO and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Among those on the cutting edge of such new thinking has been the prestigious Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, whose editorial board includes such luminaries as former Chief of the General Staff Mordechai Gur, former chiefs of military intelligence Yehoshofat Harkabi and Aharon

Yariv, and current Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Two of its previous reports, *The West Bank and Gaza: Options for Peace* and *Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Towards a Solution*, provoked intense debate in Israel for effectively endorsing precisely those ideas mentioned above. *The Intifada: Causes and Effects*, while less directly concerned with such questions than its predecessors, is nonetheless equally valuable for the insights it provides into the perceptions of Israel's national security establishment.

Shalev, a former chief of estimates for Israeli military intelligence, IDF spokesperson during the 1967 war, and military governor of the West Bank during the highly turbulent years of 1974-76, seeks to identify the primary and secondary causes of the intifada and discuss its actual and potential ramifications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, this is perhaps the last reason why the book deserves to be read.

Throughout, Shalev performs the standard ideological and analytical acrobatics that have made much of Israeli scholarship on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so annoying to read. Thus, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are "Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District"; it is taken for granted that any Palestinian detainee is, by virtue of his or her arrest, either a "terrorist" or guilty of serious security offenses (which amounts to the same thing); it is an article of faith that Israeli soldiers meticulously follow open-fire regulations, that these regulations are designed to minimize Palestinian casualties, and that they permit lethal force to be used only in life-threatening situations; and so on. Euphemism is also part of the stock in trade; for example, Rabin's exhortation of 19 January 1988 to use "force, might, and beatings" to crush the uprising now reads: "The defense minister directed that riot batons be wielded against violent demonstrators only, and only while a riot was in progress; rioters were not to be beaten as punishment once the incident had ended" (p. 107).

More generally, Shalev appears to subscribe to the notion of a "benign occupation" between 1967 and 1987. This is most in evidence when on several occasions he ascribes the daring of Palestinian youth during the intifada not to their desire to be rid of Israeli military rule, but rather to the "fact" that unlike their parents they do not remember the severity with which the previous Arab regimes crushed dissent and therefore have no inbred fear of political militancy (pp. 19, 75-76). Yet, if comparisons between Israeli and Arab rule really are so much in Israel's favor,

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