## LIMITED FRAMEWORK

The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, by Itzhak Galnoor. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. xv + 298 pages. Notes and Bibliography to p. 365. Index to p. 379. $21.95 paper; $64.50 cloth.

Reviewed by Esther Neuwirth

As the lines of partition between Israel and the emerging Palestinian entity change before our very eyes, this book offers a timely contribution to academic debates. The author, Itzhak Galnoor, is a professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and editor of the Eshkolot Library, a book series on society and politics in Israel. The purpose of the book, part of a larger study on "state, territory, and boundaries" (p. xv), is an examination of these concepts within the Zionist movement in the period prior to the establishment of the Israeli state. Galnoor's study provides a theoretical model for understanding the concepts of boundaries, territories and the state, through a focus on the Zionist movement. Although he grapples with these concepts, his framework is limited, and the implications problematic. I shall first summarize the book's key contributions and then provide a critical reading of the main argument.

Galnoor stresses that great insights can be drawn by examining Palestinian and Israeli positions and connections between the events of 1937 and the present: ". . .the more I read the arguments presented in

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1937, the more I realized how little has changed over the past fifty years in the fundamental debate on territory and boundaries. Not a single argument raised today on these issues by both Israelis and Palestinians was not expressed back then by the participants in the debate" (p. 4). The author illustrates this point to some extent with a comprehensive examination of debates within the Zionist movement.

The book focuses on the Zionist movement's decision-making process in response to the 1937 report of the British Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel. The main argument is that although the actual decisions that came out of the 1937 debates among Zionists were not relevant in the short term because the British did away with the Peel Commission's recommendations, these debates were the most extensive ever to take place in Zionist circles. The main decision that emerged favored territorial partition in exchange for sovereignty. Thus, the period marks a crossroads for the Zionist movement because instrumental arguments won out over expressive arguments, paving the way for adoption of the partition plan in 1947 and the emergence of the Israeli state.

Expressive arguments in this schema address history, nation-people-community, religion-culture, geography, and symbols, whereas instrumental arguments deal with state, defense, society, economic viability, transportation, and communication. The author's use of the term "instrumental" can be read as practical or pragmatic and "expressive" as ideological or emotional (p. 93). Although recognizing its limitations, the author resurrects the instrumental-expressive distinction central to Talcott Parson's theory of social action developed more than forty years ago. Galnoor tries to neatly fit the decision-making process into these categories in order to show how and when the instrumental supersedes the expressive and the prac-

tical effects of such a shift in decision making.

Galnoor concludes that when instrumental arguments are dominant, as in the 1937 debates of the Zionist movement, self-determination is possible and players are open to negotiating in a non-zero sum game. On the other hand, when expressive arguments are dominant, as for Palestinians, negotiation and self-determination are not attainable. In this scenario, the debates of 1937 prove that the Zionists were willing to negotiate, but Palestinians were not, which explains why an Israeli state emerged, and a Palestinian state did not. Palestinians used expressive arguments and were not willing in the end to give up territory for sovereignty. Zionists were more pragmatic, utilized instrumental arguments, and thus achieved statehood. This conclusion is troubling for a number of reasons.

First, throughout the book, there is limited discussion of debates among Palestinians, and Galnoor begins by stating that this is not the scope of the study. Yet, he develops a theory that compares the relative strengths of Zionist and Palestinian decision-making processes. The book does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the Palestinian debates during this period to support such a comparative conclusion.

Second, identifying Zionists or Israelis with the instrumental and Palestinians with the expressive and then blaming the failure of Palestinians on this choice of a decision-making strategy is an approach that Edward Said calls "blaming the victim." Instrumentalist approaches have been associated with what is rational, Western, and masculine, while the expressive has been linked with the opposite. This type of Orientalist discourse then feminizes Palestinians and indirectly associates them with the emotional, irrational, Eastern, and feminine, while failing to highlight configurations of power and forces of domination that author such distinctions.

The history of the Zionist movement and the partition of Palestine cannot be understood without an examination of configurations of power among the British, Jews, and Arabs. Imperialist ideologies within the Zionist movement, the British Empire's attempts to dominate and restructure Palestine, and the efforts to produce European hegemony within the Arab world all contributed to the emer-gence of the Israeli state and the displacement and marginalization of the Palestinian population. Scott Atran names the process that took place from 1917–39 "the surrogate colonization of Palestine," as it consisted of a foreign power giving rights over land inhabited predominantly by an indigenous population to a nonnative group (see for example *American Ethnologist* 16, no. 4 (1989), pp. 719-44). Galnoor does not take into serious consideration the dynamics that contributed to the partition of Palestine and to the decision-making processes of this period.

For those interested in Zionist debates about boundaries of the proposed state of Israel, this book offers interesting and well-documented historical accounts drawn from primary sources. Galnoor provides a comprehensive list of key parties in the Zionist movement, a chronology of main events in the period from 1936–39, an extensive bibliography, a detailed index and several historical maps. Although this is not critical analysis in the spirit of recent Israeli historiography, (*JPS* 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 78-88), it can offer a point of departure for examining the positions of Zionists on partition and territory from the prestate period to the present.

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## HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

**Peace For Palestine: First Lost Opportunity**, by Elmer Berger. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1993. xv + 242 pages. Notes to p. 270. Bibliography to p. 274. Index to p. 287. Maps. $39.95 cloth.

Reviewed by **Allan C. Brownfeld**

In this book, Elmer Berger relates the proposals and counterproposals, the conspiracies and power plays which took place during the 1949 armistice negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He argues that the basic negotiating strategies of the main players have persisted almost unchanged into the present, a "near rigidity" that has defeated all efforts to achieve peace.

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